Evo Morales running for reelection in 2014?

The Inter-American Dialogue folks asked me to comment on the probability of Evo Morales being reelected to a third term as Bolivia’s president. I’ve commented on this before. 

But here’s a link to the PDF of the IAD’s weekly Latin American Advisor newsletter with my comments, as well as those by Carlos Mesa (former Bolivian president), Kathryn Ledebur (director of the Bolivia-based Andean Information Network), and Iván Rebolledo (president of Bolivian-American Chamber of Commerce).

Thoughts on Bolivia’s expulsion of USAID

I was asked to comment on the recent announcement by Bolivia’s president, Evo Morales, to expel USAID from Bolivia on WBEZ (Chicago’s NPR affiliate) for their midday Worldview program. It was a pleasant conversation, and you can listen to the podcast here (when it’s available). But I wanted to flesh out some of my main points (some of which I didn’t get to pursue adequately).

1) US Secretary of State John Kerry used a poor choice of words when he  referred to Latin America as “America’s backyard.” To be fair, the full context of the statement referred to reviving US interests in the region. But because he used the term “backyard” rather than “neighbor”—and in particular because of how that term has been used in the past—it came off as offensive. Morales made sure to mention Kerry’s statement in his own May Day announcement.

2) Morales made the announcement on May Day. Since his first May Day as president (in 2006), Morales has used the event to announce a major policy program or the nationalization of a significant industry. But after eight years, there’s no much left to nationalize. This was a good substitute. Besides, he’s been threatening to expel USAID for years (he previously expelled the DEA and the Peace Corps, as well as the US ambassador), so in many ways it was simply a question of when.

3) Morales is preparing to run for a (constitutionally dubious) third term as president. That means that he’s in campaign mode and couldn’t let May Day pass without a major announcement. The US is not particularly popular in Bolivia, and making nationalist and anti-imperialist pronouncements are always popular moves.

4) USAID has a long history of involvement in Bolivia, working in development projects. In the 1980s, this began to include democratization and civil society projects. And in recent decades, USAID projects have tended to be smaller in scope and decentralized. So while the 1960s USAID model was to fund large infrastructure projects (the airport in El Alto was a USAID project), recently it has funded grass roots organizations and smaller projects (if you’re drinking Bolivian fair trade organic coffee today, thank USAID). But this means that a lot of grass roots organizations have ties to USAID and are trained in “political” skills like advocacy, organization, promotion, etc. In particular, Morales has been upset that environmentalist organizations (with either direct or indirect links to USAID) have recently challenged many of his government’s big development projects (such as the TIPNIS highway).

Overall, I think this is a combination of several factors that can’t easily be addressed. US-Bolivian relations (at least in terms of rhetoric and public perception) are too far frayed to resolve quickly or easily. The seeds of this run deep and stem from US support for the military dictatorships in the 1960s and 1970s to heavy-handed US-led coca eradication campaigns in the 1980s and 1990s. US diplomats have to be very careful and avoid any missteps.

But there’s also a critical problem of perception from Morales himself, both about what the US is “doing” in Bolivia and what the proper role of development assistance is. If the argument is that Bolivia should not depend on foreign donor assistance, then this is difficult to sustain. Bolivia is more self-sufficient than it was in the past, but “international cooperation” (as it’s locally called) plays a key role in the country’s development strategy. International donor countries (and organizations) tend to prefer to retain some oversight and not just hand wads of cash to recipient countries. That’s understandable. Morales will have a tough time convincing any donor country/agency/organization to simply hand over money earmarked for development programs and not allow some degree of “interference.”

The second problems is that international donors today take a much more holistic approach to development. This is true for USAID as well. The old model was that a foreign agency would show up, drill a water well, and walk away. Today, the approach is different. The agency will help the local community discuss their problems, establish a policy process, and use the water well as a way to help build social capital. Today, economic and social development goals go hand in hand with democratization goals. This means that development aid is “political” in the sense that it encourages grass roots organizations to take an active role in determining and defending their interests. Some of the “graduates” of these programs may very well go on to challenge political authority structures (either at the local, regional, or national level).

Does that mean that these programs are “politically subversive”? Yes. Of course they are. Socioeconomic development is by its nature subversive. If we increase a community’s literacy, it becomes more educated, which makes it more politically aware. Studies regularly demonstrate that higher educated, healthier, wealthier people (those with more resources) are more likely to participate in politics. Any development project that improves the socioeconomic conditions of local people by its nature alters the political landscape.

The real underlying problem, of course, is that Morales is trying to build a hegemonic political project. It’s why he wants to run for a third consecutive term. Allowing grass roots organizations independent access to resources makes them a threat to such a project. It’s much easier to keep local organizations in line (whether you call it co-option or coercion is irrelevant, if you’re looking at the behavioral results) if they depend on state resources.

So that’s the real dilemma. Morales won’t allow USAID to return to Bolivia so long as it is involved in promoting pluralist visions of democracy. And the modern development paradigm inherently seeks to promote pluralist democracy.

5 Pairs of Countries That Americans Confuse

From mentalflossr:

image

Last Friday, a flurry of social media activity mistakenly identified the Boston bombing suspects as having a Czech, rather than Chechen, background. The Czech ambassador to the US issued a statement clarifying that “the Czech Republic and Chechnya are two very different entities—the Czech Republic is a Central European country; Chechnya is a part of the Russian Federation.”

Here are five other pairs of countries Americans get mixed up.

Geography matters.

mentalflossr

From globalvoices: Will Bolivia allow President Evo Morales to run for re-election? It all depends whether a constitutional court decides he is currently serving his first or second term. A quick comment (since I’m a Bolivianist, after all) on this evolving story (ironically, as I head off to my Populism in Latin America course): The legitimacy of the reelection of presidents is a tricky thing, conceptually. On the one hand, there’s nothing intrinsically bad (or even undemocratic) about allowing a sitting president to run again for office. Assuming it’s a free & fair election (which I still think is the case in Bolivia), then there’s no clear reason why a popular majority can’t reelect a president. The problem has to do with long term consequences of repeated reelections. Evo Morales came to power in 2006 (he was elected in December of 2005, but inaugurated in January of  2006). If he wins reelection (which he almost certainly would, if he were to run) next year, he will have already been in office for 8 years. If he won another five year term, he would be president for 13 years at the end of that term. That would be one year longer than the 12-year post-revolutionary MNR government that lasted from 1952-1964 (and ended in a military coup). The long term consequences are two fold: 1) Is it desirable for any one person to hold power for that long? 2) What does it say about the institutional capacity of the party or movement (MAS) that there’s no other leader waiting to take the reigns of power in an orderly, inter-party transition?  The first question could be solved by strong institutional checks and balances, primarily by strengthening the legislature, the courts, and the local and regional autonomous governments. Unfortunately, those checks have been eroded over time. The 2011 judicial elections were poorly orchestrated and have weakened the courts. The legislature is dominated by MAS and now serves as rubber stamp for presidential prerogatives. And the local and regional governments are regularly harassed by the central government which is glad to use an anti-corruption law to remove opposition mayors and governors (it works because the law states that anyone accused of a crime is removed automatically during the investigation; not surprisingly, almost all such cases involve opposition politicians; and the president is immune from the law). The real problem is the long term consequences for MAS. By arguing that “only Evo” can lead MAS and secure the gains of his government, which are significant (in particular the increased attention to poverty & inequality, an emphasis on multicultural rights & autonomy, and the recent decentralization reforms), suggests that MAS is weak. Protecting the regime’s gains will mean institutionalizing the regime, not securing the leader’s power. Arguing that “only Evo” can defend the regime suggests that either (a) no one else within MAS is capable or (b) no one else within MAS believes in the regime. At some point, Evo Morales will have to give up power (either through an orderly transition to a successor, or losing an election, or being overthrown, or death). The sooner MAS begins to prepare for that transition, the better. A strong MAS can ensure that it either achieves an orderly transition (with or without the death of the leader), it can prevent a coup, or it can survive as a loyal opposition to any new government. That’s the real test for the new Bolivian regime. Even looking only at Bolivian history is instructive. The MNR managed to share power among its caudillos (primarily Paz Estenssoro and Siles Zuazo) at first, but then it broke down. The attempt to create a dominant-party system ultimately failed and led to a military crackdown that reversed many of the revolution’s gains and persecuted many of its leaders. Similarly, it was the inability of the great caudillos of the 1980s and 1990s Bolivian parties (Paz Zamora, Hugo Banzer, Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada, and even Carlos Palenque) to transfer leadership to a successor that doomed those parties. If MAS is a true instrument of popular power, with a strong institutionalized coalition of key sectors of Bolivian society, then it should be able to present a slate of future leaders to the electorate. Because if the party is merely a vehicle for Evo Morales, then it will likely suffer the same fate as Condepa. Does MAS want to look forward to descending into the kind of crass soap opera drama that was the fight for Condepa’s remains among Palenque’s family and friends? And as crass as that was, Condepa was never in power. How much more crass (and chaotic) would such a struggle be when the contestants aren’t just picking over the remains of a political project, but a government apparatus?

From globalvoices:

Will Bolivia allow President Evo Morales to run for re-election? It all depends whether a constitutional court decides he is currently serving his first or second term.

A quick comment (since I’m a Bolivianist, after all) on this evolving story (ironically, as I head off to my Populism in Latin America course):

The legitimacy of the reelection of presidents is a tricky thing, conceptually. On the one hand, there’s nothing intrinsically bad (or even undemocratic) about allowing a sitting president to run again for office. Assuming it’s a free & fair election (which I still think is the case in Bolivia), then there’s no clear reason why a popular majority can’t reelect a president.

The problem has to do with long term consequences of repeated reelections. Evo Morales came to power in 2006 (he was elected in December of 2005, but inaugurated in January of  2006). If he wins reelection (which he almost certainly would, if he were to run) next year, he will have already been in office for 8 years. If he won another five year term, he would be president for 13 years at the end of that term. That would be one year longer than the 12-year post-revolutionary MNR government that lasted from 1952-1964 (and ended in a military coup). The long term consequences are two fold: 1) Is it desirable for any one person to hold power for that long? 2) What does it say about the institutional capacity of the party or movement (MAS) that there’s no other leader waiting to take the reigns of power in an orderly, inter-party transition? 

The first question could be solved by strong institutional checks and balances, primarily by strengthening the legislature, the courts, and the local and regional autonomous governments. Unfortunately, those checks have been eroded over time. The 2011 judicial elections were poorly orchestrated and have weakened the courts. The legislature is dominated by MAS and now serves as rubber stamp for presidential prerogatives. And the local and regional governments are regularly harassed by the central government which is glad to use an anti-corruption law to remove opposition mayors and governors (it works because the law states that anyone accused of a crime is removed automatically during the investigation; not surprisingly, almost all such cases involve opposition politicians; and the president is immune from the law).

The real problem is the long term consequences for MAS. By arguing that “only Evo” can lead MAS and secure the gains of his government, which are significant (in particular the increased attention to poverty & inequality, an emphasis on multicultural rights & autonomy, and the recent decentralization reforms), suggests that MAS is weak. Protecting the regime’s gains will mean institutionalizing the regime, not securing the leader’s power. Arguing that “only Evo” can defend the regime suggests that either (a) no one else within MAS is capable or (b) no one else within MAS believes in the regime. At some point, Evo Morales will have to give up power (either through an orderly transition to a successor, or losing an election, or being overthrown, or death). The sooner MAS begins to prepare for that transition, the better. A strong MAS can ensure that it either achieves an orderly transition (with or without the death of the leader), it can prevent a coup, or it can survive as a loyal opposition to any new government. That’s the real test for the new Bolivian regime.

Even looking only at Bolivian history is instructive. The MNR managed to share power among its caudillos (primarily Paz Estenssoro and Siles Zuazo) at first, but then it broke down. The attempt to create a dominant-party system ultimately failed and led to a military crackdown that reversed many of the revolution’s gains and persecuted many of its leaders. Similarly, it was the inability of the great caudillos of the 1980s and 1990s Bolivian parties (Paz Zamora, Hugo Banzer, Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada, and even Carlos Palenque) to transfer leadership to a successor that doomed those parties.

If MAS is a true instrument of popular power, with a strong institutionalized coalition of key sectors of Bolivian society, then it should be able to present a slate of future leaders to the electorate. Because if the party is merely a vehicle for Evo Morales, then it will likely suffer the same fate as Condepa. Does MAS want to look forward to descending into the kind of crass soap opera drama that was the fight for Condepa’s remains among Palenque’s family and friends? And as crass as that was, Condepa was never in power. How much more crass (and chaotic) would such a struggle be when the contestants aren’t just picking over the remains of a political project, but a government apparatus?

globalvoices

Via globalvoices:

The “Gangnam Style” parody has reached Bolivia. Earlier this week, KwonBanYa, a Bolivian YouTube user, uploaded a humorous version of the Korean rap-pop song featuring President Evo Morales and vicepresident Alvaro García Linera.

It’s blocked (at least in the US) due to piracy concerns. Which is odd, since similar parodies aren’t blocked elsewhere. Heh.

Hi Miguel, sorry to bother you, but I find your blog very interesting and informative. However, I notice that you usually use Pagina Siete as your source. Can I ask is this a left-wing or right-wing source? I don't know anything about Bolivia's newspapers and don't speak Spanish so I can't use their website to judge for myself. — Asked by loonyloo

Pagina Siete is a centrist paper, difficult to pin down in the Bolivian political spectrum. It’s definitely not pro Evo (so it gets accused of being “right wing” — although anyone who doesn’t march lockstep w/ Evo gets that designation these days). The paper was founded by former La Razón staffers who left after that paper turned decisively pro government (although not too blatantly) and changed its editorial positions. On the “left” is a wide range of papers that get little or no circulation (mostly pamphlets from various splinter factions ranging from Trotskyites to kataristas). A pro government paper (Cambio) exists, but since I don’t consider Evo to be “left” (in the traditional academic sense), I won’t describe Cambio as a “left” paper. The “right” newspaper in La Paz is clearly El Diario. Overall, I like Pagina Siete because I trust it and like that it goes further than most papers in approaching the kind of “investigative” journalism I prefer. It also has better online graphics and has better connections with high quality polling organizations. Hope that answers your question.

1 play

From adam-wola:

In a new WOLA Podcast, I talk with Kathryn Ledebur at the Andean Information Network in Cochabamba, Bolivia. We talk about a recent State Department counter-drug report that attacks Bolivia, while the country seeks an exemption from an international ban on coca leaves.

"Surgen pedidos de desterrar a líderes indígenas del TIPNIS" | Pagina Siete

In a strange (but not unexpected) turn of events, there’s a push by dissident factions w/in TIPNIS (although it’s unclear whether they are colonos or indigenous) to (a) demand the construction of the highway through the nature preserve and indigenous territory and (b) to expel and seize the lands of (desterrar) the indigenous leaders who led the march in opposition to the highway construction.

"Underneath the sweater: Bolivia’s Evo Morales faces mounting opposition" | WBEZ Worldview

An interview/conversation on the recent TIPNIS protests in Bolivia on Worldview, a global affairs program on NPR-affiliate WBEZ in Chicago.

addtoany.com

Travel Writer Michael Jacobs Does Justice to the Andes | Focal Points, the Blog of FPIF

From thoughtsfromtheandes:

Taking a step away from politics it is goo to take a look at some of the reasons that people first start looking at Latin America, its travel and tourism opportunities.  This most recent book by Michael Jacbos, “Andes” takes a look at the “spine” of South America.